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MEMORANDUM FOR:

DCI 8. MAR 1985

The attached memorandum is in response to your request for information on Qadhafi's inner circle and their impact on his policies. 25X1

The author of this paper is [redacted]  
Office of Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis,  
with a contribution from the Office of Central  
Reference.

Deputy Chief [redacted] Division 25X1

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Date 5 March 1985

5 March 1985

## MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: The Roots of Libyan Foreign Policy: Qadhafi  
and His Advisors

1. Available evidence indicates that Libyan foreign policies are crafted almost exclusively by Qadhafi. His behavior in the international arena is generally based on his personal philosophy of revolution contained in the Green Book. He sees himself as a leader and agent of historic forces that will reorder both Libyan society and Third World politics. Qadhafi translates these ideas into action by providing military and financial aid to radical regimes, by supporting--or creating--subversive groups seeking to overthrow moderate governments, and on by occasion abetting international terrorists. [REDACTED]

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2. Qadhafi's personal involvement in diplomacy is a principal factor in Libya's erratic and often ill-informed foreign policy. Qadhafi's predilection to lecture and harangue often alienates the very leaders he tries to court. Political or economic commitments made by Libyan officials to foreign governments frequently are unfulfilled unless Qadhafi is engaged in the decision-making. He frequently uses private meetings with foreign leaders to make impromptu decisions without consulting his advisors. [REDACTED] Qadhafi's personal responsibility for such actions as the bombing of Omdurman radio station in Sudan in March 1984, the mining of the Red Sea four months later, and the granting of \$100 million to Nicaragua last fall. He also decided on his own to pick up on the offer of union from Morocco's King Hassan. [REDACTED]

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3. Qadhafi judiciously guards his independence from the Soviet and US influence. [REDACTED] Moscow has not been able to translate its role as Qadhafi's primary source of military aid into any lasting influence on Libyan decision-making. Soviet interest has had little impact on Qadhafi's decisions. Moscow criticized the Libyan use of Soviet mines in the Red Sea, [REDACTED] Qadhafi backs radical Palestinians who reject compromise on Arab-Israeli issues, while the USSR supports PLO chief Arafat and Palestinian recognition of Israel's right to exist. [REDACTED]

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4. Nevertheless, we believe that Qadhafi draws on the Soviets, as well as East Europeans and perhaps North Koreans, for occasional decisionmaking support or intelligence information.

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[redacted] We have found no link between Soviet and Libyan backing for Nicaragua and Moscow is unlikely to coordinate its efforts with the unpredictable Qadhafi. The Soviets may encourage Managua to obtain US Libyan financial aid--Qadhafi has given around \$400 million to offset US pressure on Nicaragua--while cautioning against close ties. [redacted]

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- pro-Qadhafi extremists; generally members of Qadhafi's tribe, who advocate whatever foreign policies or tactics they believe will perpetuate the Qadhafi clan's survival at home;
- ideologues fanatically committed to spreading Qadhafi's personal philosophies of world wide revolution;
- pragmatic radicals supportive of Qadhafi's determination to expand Libya influence abroad, but more willing than the ideolgues to make tactical compromises in the direction of moderation;
- Libyan nationalists who often disagree with Qadhafi's policies, but remain personally loyal to Qadhafi because they shared in his rise to power. Qadhafi, in our view, retains these officials out of personal loyalty stemming from their long association with him. [redacted]

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7. The ideologues, probably with occasional support of pro-Qadhafi extremists, are entrusted with implementing many of Libya's most egregious foreign operations, such as assassination attempts on moderate Arab leaders and regime opponents. Examples of activities undertaken by the ideologues are: the shooting incident in London last April; the ritualistic public hanging each April of students in Libya deemed insufficiently revolutionary or anti-Qadhafi; the killing or wounding of five Libyan dissidents in Athens and Rome in 1984; plotting against Sudanese President Nimeiri, Egyptian President Mubarak, and Chadian President Habre; and the urging of militant anti-US

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policies by Carribbean leftists. The rise of the ideologues and pro-Qadhafi extremists has especially lessened the impact on policy of the nationalists. [REDACTED]

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8. Pro-Qadhafi Extremists include:

- Major Khalifa Hunaysh, the most powerful person in Libya after Qadhafi because of his control over Qadhafi's personal security force and his ready access to Qadhafi. Hunaysh is a cousin of Qadhafi.
- Major Khuwaylidi al-Humaydi, Deputy Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces, head of Military Intelligence, and a member of the 11-man Free Officers group that helped Qadhafi to power in 1969. Qadhafi uses Al-Humaydi as a diplomatic envoy to several countries. He has been involved in Libyan efforts to negotiate an economic and security accord with Tunisia and he has been one of Qadhafi's representatives to work out a rapprochement with Khartoum.
- Ahmad Qadhaf al-Dam, another cousin of Qadhafi, who serves as his chief envoy abroad. Qadhaf al-Dam played a key role in mediating Libya's rapprochement with Saudi Arabia and Morocco in 1983. He also has been entrusted with sensitive diplomatic missions to Egypt, Sudan, and Western Europe.
- Colonel Mas'ud Abd al-Hafiz, a cousin and possibly a brother-in-law of Qadhafi's, is generally assigned to Libya's most important military command positions and probably advises Qadhafi on military matters. [REDACTED]

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9. Ideologues include:

- Abd al-Salam Jallud, titular head of the Libya's fanatical Revolutionary Committees, who is Libya's de facto deputy chief of state and another member of the military group that brought Qadhafi to power. Jallud is a fervent revolutionary and has made speeches in the past year advocating Libyan interference in US domestic politics as well as terrorism against US personnel and facilities. He often acts as Qadhafi's spokesman on foreign policy issues and is a pegpoint for Libyan support for radical Palestinians and Lebanese leftists.
- Lt. Colonel Abd al-Rahman Shaybi, deputy director of the General Intelligence Department. Shaybi was Libya's chief negotiator with the British in gaining safe conduct out of the UK for Libyans implicated in the London shooting incident last year.

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Jan 5 (Pending) from 3/1 to  
3/5. (NESA response to 2/19 C-gram)



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